MORON SPECIALIS

I have been challenged on one—and only one—point in the Lex Fridman debate. Here is the relevant excerpt from the official transcript.  I have filled in the legal term that I used and placed it in upper case:

          STEVEN BONNELL(03:17:58) I don’t know if you used the phrase dolus specialis, that the intentional part of genocide-

          MOUIN RABBANI (03:17:58) I don’t know that term.

          STEVEN BONNELL (03:18:35) I think it’s called dolus specialis, it’s the most important part of genocide, which is proving it is a highly special intent to commit genocide. It’s possible that Israel could-

         NORMAN FINKELSTEIN (03:18:43) That’s MENS REA 03:18:43].

           STEVEN BONNELL (03:18:46) Yes, I understand the state of mind, but for genocide, it’s called dolus specialis. It’s a highly special intent. Did you read the case?

          NORMAN FINKELSTEIN (03:18:47) Yeah.

         STEVEN BONNELL (03:18:54) It is a highly special intent [inaudible 03:18:56]-

MENS REA (criminal intent, from the Latin for “guilty mind”) denotes the legal principle at stake while DOLUS SPECIALIS (criminal intent to commit genocide) denotes one application of it.  Here is an example of this usage from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda:

“In considering whether a perpetrator had the requisite mens rea, regard must be had to his mode of participation in the given crime. Under the Bisesero Indictment, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was convicted of aiding and abetting genocide while Gérard Ntakirutimana was convicted of committing genocide.  The requisite mens rea for aiding and abetting genocide is the accomplice’s knowledge of the genocidal intent of the principal perpetrators. From the evidence, the Trial Chamber found that the attackers in Bisesero had the specific genocidal intent. Furthermore, in the view of the Appëals Chamber, it is clear that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana knew of this intent. The Trial Chamber found that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was present during several attacks on refugees in Bisesero, including situations where the armed attackers sang: ‘Exterminate t .... Let them; look for them everywhere; kill them; and ... exterminate them’, while chasing and killing Tutsis. It is from this, as well as from Iris transporting the armed attackers and directing them toward fleeing Tutsi refugees that the Trial Chamber found that Elizaphan Ntaldrutimana had the requisite intent to commit genocide, convicting him of aiding and abetting genocide. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, it is not necessary to consider whether the Trial Chamber correctly concluded that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana had the specific intent to commit genocide, given that it convicted him not of committing that crime, but rather of aiding and abetting genocide, a mode of criminal participation which does not require the specific intent. The Appeals Chamber finds that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana knew of the genocidal intent of the attackers whom he aided and abetted in the perpetration of genocide in Bisesero and, therefore, that he possessed the requisite mens rea for that crime.” (https://ucr.irmct.org/LegalRef/CMSDocStore/Public/English/Judgement/NotIndexable/ICTR-96-17/MSC12461R0000545560.PDF)

Did these distinguished judges err by referring to mens rea and not dolus specialis?  I was stating the obvious that the critical point of contention in a genocide case is proving criminal INTENT (“That’s mens rea”), and of course everyone in the room understood that the threshold under the Genocide Convention is proving criminal INTENT to commit genocide.  Speaking of fantastic morons, I wonder how Mr. Vermicelli is doing.